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Abstract
The returns to education (RTE) for entrepreneurs, unlike for em-
ployees, have not yet been estimated by methods coping with the po-
tential endogeneity problem. We estimate the RTE for entrepreneurs
and employees while testing for and coping with this problem. Our
results derived from a large US sample strongly indicate that OLS ren-
ders downward biased RTE's for entrepreneurs and employees. The
bias is larger for entrepreneurs. This leads to an interesting and pol-
icy relevant result: The RTE are higher for entrepreneurs than for
employees (14% and 10%, respectively), whereas previous estimates
suggested similar RTE's. Tests indicate that this result is robust.
¤We would like to give special thanks to Rob Alessie for some excellent suggestions.
The paper has further bene¯ted from discussions at the Annual Meeting of the Economic
Council of Sweden, the 2004 Babson Kaufman conference in Glasgow, as well as from a
seminar at ESADE Business School, Barcelona.
yCorrespondence author: University of Amsterdam / Scholar, Roetersstraat 11, 1018
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11 Introduction
Policy makers and academic researchers are increasingly aware of the impor-
tance of entrepreneurship in our society. Entrepreneurs are often seen as the
engine of the economy, responsible for sustained levels of competition, the
creation of jobs, and new innovating processes and products. These bene¯ts,
that accrue to society at large, justify public expenditures in the development
of entrepreneurship. To stimulate the further development of entrepreneurs,
policy makers have implemented entrepreneurship stimulation programs on
schools, and have made several subsidies and support services available for
start-ups and small ¯rms.
However, the question remains in which way optimal stimulation of en-
trepreneurial performance can be achieved. There is one factor that both
academic scholars and policy makers see as an important determinant of en-
trepreneurial performance, namely human capital. We think that the correct
measurement of the magnitude of the returns to human capital is therefore
of utmost importance to device and implement e®ective policies. However, a
recent meta-analysis (Van der Sluis, Van Praag & Vijverberg 2003) reveals
that the e®ect of formal schooling, one of the most prominent manifestations
of human capital, on entrepreneurial performance has not yet been measured
consistently. This is due to shortcomings in the empirical strategies applied
so far. Previous studies measuring the relationship between education and
entrepreneurial performance merely measure (conditional) correlations rather
than causal e®ects. No attempt has yet been made to apply identi¯cation
strategies such as Instrumental Variables, twins studies and the like in order
to estimate causal e®ects that are not biased due to the neglect of unob-
2served heterogeneity and the endogenous nature of the decision to invest in
schooling.
Our aim is to measure the returns to education for entrepreneurs and re-
late its magnitude to the returns to education for employees. To this end, we
will estimate the returns to education for both entrepreneurs and employees.
Using the same methodology for both samples will allow us to compare the
size of the omitted ability biases, the magnitude of the returns to education,
and the importance of sample selection for both groups. To investigate the
e®ects of omitted ability and endogenous education, we include a set of de-
tailed ability proxies into our regression equations that we estimate by means
of a random-e®ects model applying an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach.
We use the US National Longitudinal Survey Youth cohort (NLSY) as our
sample.
Our results reveal that the returns to education are higher for entrepreneurs
than for employees, and that applying an Instrumental Variables approach
widens the di®erence between the two. The rather large di®erence we ¯nd
can not be attributed to sample selection or any of the other alternative
explanations we address when performing robustness checks. We therefore
arrive at interesting policy recommendations that follow from the estimation
results under quite broad assumptions.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides an
overview of the literature of the returns to education for entrepreneurs. It
also describes the methods used for obtaining unbiased estimates of the re-
turns to education for employees. Section 3 describes the sample used and
the methodology applied. In Section 4, we estimate the e®ect of education
3on the incomes of both entrepreneurs and employees, using the same vari-
ables and the same estimation techniques. Moreover, we perform several
robustness checks. Finally, results are discussed, and conclusions and policy
recommendations are provided in Section 5.
2 Empirical literature
The relationship between schooling and entrepreneurship entry and perfor-
mance has been measured in various empirical studies. Van der Sluis, Van
Praag and Vijverberg (2003) ,VVV 2003 hereafter) provide an overview of
such empirical studies into the impact of schooling on entrepreneurship se-
lection and performance. They perform a meta-analysis in order to as-
sess whether there are any consistent ¯ndings from the vast empirical en-
trepreneurship and economic literatures with respect to the impact of edu-
cation on performance in and choice of entrepreneurship.
For the sake of their meta-analysis, VVV have ¯rst gathered all relevant
studies pertaining to industrialized countries that meet certain reasonable cri-
teria. Each of the 94 resulting studies measures, among others, the impact of
schooling on entrepreneurship entry, performance, or both for a speci¯c sam-
ple. This results in 299 observations in their database. Almost 50% of these
observations pertain to the relationship between education and entrepreneur
performance, the topic of this paper, whereas the remainder measures the
relationship between education and entrepreneurship entry (or the more hy-
brid measure of whether or not an individual is an entrepreneur in a certain
year). The 145 studies measuring the relationship between performance and
4education use various performance measures, but the majority (i.e., 58%)
focusses on the entrepreneur's earnings, which is consistent with the focus
of the current study. Furthermore, out of the set of performance studies,
38% uses the most commonly used measure of educational achievement that
we are interested in, i.e., years of schooling. Taking the intersection of these
two subsets of the sample, only 34 observations appear to be measuring the
returns to education, i.e., the e®ect of years of education on earnings, in the
sense that we are interested in. Most of these studies involve the United
States. An additional condition should be met for a comparable measure-
ment of the rate of return to education: earnings should be measured in
logarithms. This additional requirement is met by 21 observations only, all
pertaining to the US. Apart from concluding from this that the use of def-
initions of performance and education has been fairly scattered, we wish to
pay attention to four important outcomes from this meta-analysis.
First, the impact of education on selection into an entrepreneurial position
is mostly, i.e., in 75% of cases, insigni¯cant. The impact of schooling on
performance, however, is unambiguous and signi¯cantly positive for 67% of
the observations. For the sub-sample of observations that consider earnings
as their performance measure, this percentage amounts to even more than
80. We conclude that entrepreneurship performance is signi¯cantly a®ected
by schooling.
Second, the meta-analysis gives insight into the level of the returns to
education for entrepreneurs. This insight, though, can only be based on
the small sub-sample of 21 US observations that use similar measures for
education and for earnings. The return to a marginal year of schooling in
5terms of the income it generates turns out to be 6.1%. on average.
Third, the meta-analysis allows a comparison of the rate of return to ed-
ucation for entrepreneurs to the returns to education for employees. This
comparison is based on the results from studies that compare the rates of
returns of these two groups of labor market participants using one dataset
and thereby one set of de¯nitions, time periods, countries, etcetera. Approx-
imately twenty papers have actually measured the returns to education for
entrepreneurs and employees in a comparable fashion. From these studies
the third result is obtained: the returns to education are at least as high for
employees as they are for entrepreneurs. More speci¯cally, all studies per-
taining to Europe indicate that the returns to education are slightly lower
for entrepreneurs than for employees. However, the opposite result is found
for the studies that pertain to the United States.
A smaller part of these twenty studies focuses on the screening function
of education. One of the ways in which the (strong or weak version of the)
screening hypothesis is tested empirically, is to compare the returns to edu-
cation for employees to the returns for entrepreneurs, where the latter group
is considered as an unscreened control group. Almost all screening studies
reject the strong screening hypothesis: i.e., these studies ¯nd positive re-
turns to education for entrepreneurs. However, the evidence related to the
weak screening hypothesis (WSH) is mixed. Studies based on US data re-
ject the WSH (Fredland & Little 1981, Tucker 1985, Tucker 1987, Evans &
Leighton 1990, Robinson & Sexton 1994), implying that the returns to ed-
ucation are not higher for employees than they are for entrepreneurs in the
United States. Studies using European data (UK, Italy, and The Nether-
6lands) support the WSH (Rees & Shah 1986, De Wit & Van Winden 1989,
Brown & Sessions 1998, Brown & Sessions 1999). The latter result implies
that the returns to education are lower for entrepreneurs than for employees
in Europe.
The majority of the twenty papers that compare returns to education for
entrepreneurs with those returns for employees use the comparison to high-
light di®erences in labor market participation and success factors between mi-
norities and non-minorities and/or between females and males (Moore 1982,
Gill 1988, MacPherson 1988, Borjas & Bronars 1989, Fairlie & Meyer 1996,
Lombard 2001, Lofstrom 2002). The results from these (exclusively US) stud-
ies are consistent with the results obtained in the screening literature: the
estimated returns to education for entrepreneurs are at least as high, and
usually higher, than for employees.
The fourth conclusion from the meta-analysis is quite striking: all results
obtained so far are potentially biased. Estimation and identi¯cation strate-
gies used to identify the e®ect of education on performance have merely
measured the (conditional) correlation between education and performance
rather than the causal e®ect, which is the estimate of interest. There are
at least two possible sources of inconsistency when OLS is used to estimate
this relationship. First, there may be unobserved individual characteristics,
such as ability and motivation, that a®ect both the schooling level attained
and subsequent entrepreneurial performance. The omission of these unob-
served characteristics from a performance equation would also serve to bias
OLS estimates, where the direction and magnitude of the bias depends on
the correlation between these characteristics and the schooling level attained.
7Second, the schooling decision is probably endogenous in a performance equa-
tion because individuals are likely to base their schooling investment decision,
at least in part, on their perceptions of the expected payo®s to their invest-
ment.
The literature studying the returns to education for employees has ac-
knowledged this, and assessed the extent of these sources of bias. Theory
predicts that omitting ability in the wage equation causes OLS-estimates to
be upward biased (Griliches 1977, Harmon & Walker 1995, Ashenfelter, Har-
mon & Oosterbeek 1999). Empirical studies demonstrate mixed evidence on
the existence and even sign of such an ability bias. These studies compare
the estimated returns to education obtained with and without using a set of
ability proxies. Using such a set of ability proxies might resolve the problem
of unobserved heterogeneity. Several methods to cope with the endogeneity
problem have been applied recently to estimate the returns to education for
employees. The general conclusion from these studies is that OLS-estimates
of the returns to education for employees are biased downwards (Ashenfelter
et al. 1999).
The potential bias also makes the comparisons of returns to education
for entrepreneurs and employees suspicious. Following Griliches (1977), the
neglect of unobserved in°uential characteristics and not dealing with the
endogenous nature of the education decision can have a di®erent impact on
the estimate of the returns to education for entrepreneurs and employees. As
a result, the conclusion that the returns to education for employees is higher
in Europe and lower or equal to the returns to education for entrepreneurs
in the United States should be re-evaluated. It can only be maintained
8when it would be supported by additional research that uses more recently
developed estimation methods that account for endogeneity and unobserved
heterogeneity.
The remainder of this section is devoted to a short presentation of pos-
sible methods to obtain more consistent estimates. There are basically four
methods to account for the potential problems of endogeneity and/or un-
observed heterogeneity when estimating the returns to education. All four
have been applied to the estimation of the returns to education for employees
(Ashenfelter et al. 1999).
The ¯rst strategy to cope with unobserved ability is trying to make the
unobservable observable. To this end, various proxies of intelligence and
test scores have been added to equations from which estimates of returns to
education result. The e®ects so far of adding ability controls on the estimated
returns to education are negative for the United States, positive elsewhere
and (hence) ambiguous in total (see Ashenfelter et al., 1999, Table 3).
However, there are many reasons why the number of years of schooling
could be correlated with the disturbance term and one of these is unobserved
ability. In addition, inclusion of particular ability proxies on the right-hand
side of the earnings function does neither completely purge the estimated
returns from ability bias due to an imperfect correlation between such proxies
with on-the-job ability nor is it su±cient to control for endogeneity since
ability is not necessarily perfectly correlated with time-discounting behavior
and/or with other factors such as the degree of risk aversion. Additional
approaches are thus required and used.
The second strategy to identify causal e®ects is setting up a randomized
9experiment (Leuven, Oosterbeek & van der Klaauw 2003). The proper de-
sign of an experiment requires a random assignment of individuals into a
treatment group (participating) and a control group (not participating). In
this manner, endogeneity does not play any role since the choice to follow
education is forced. The problem is that setting up an experiment where
some people do not get (higher) education but others do, is often ethically
not feasible. Therefore, this identi¯cation strategy is seldom used.
The third strategy to identify the causal e®ect of education on perfor-
mance makes use of the speci¯c characteristics of monozygotic twins (Ashenfelter
& Kruger 1994, Behrman & Rosenzweig 1999, Rouse 1999, Bonjour, Cherkas,
Haskel, Hawkes & Spector 2003). The basic idea is that monozygotic twins
share the exact same genetic endowment and usually experience even more
similar environments than non-twin siblings or dizygotic twins do. Identi¯ca-
tion comes from those twins who di®er in their amount of schooling obtained
and their earnings, assuming that all unobserved factors are approximately
equal. There has however been some critique by Bound and Solon (1999)
on this seemingly °awless identi¯cation technique: most twin studies rely on
small samples that usually describe twins who volunteer to participate, twin
strategies are very sensitive to measurement errors, they do not really cope
with the endogeneity of the schooling decision, and it is not clear why twins
who are genetically identical end up with di®erent outcomes.
The fourth identi¯cation strategy used is the instrumental variable (IV)
approach. The idea is to ¯nd instruments that explain a substantial pro-
portion of the variance of the endogenous variable, education in this case,
while at the same time these instruments are not allowed to be related to the
10dependent variable - i.e., earnings. In this way, the instrumented endogenous
variable is not related to the error term anymore. This is the strategy that
we will apply. Although using IV seems a natural way to estimate the e®ect
of education on earnings, it is not without critique. The most important
issue in using IV is the type of instruments used. Often family background
variables are used in this respect. According to Card (1999), however, the
use of family background variables as instruments in IV (especially parental
education) can be problematic. He states that the ability of the parents
is possibly transferred to their children by inheritance. Family background
variables would then have an additional e®ect on performance. If this is the
case, then the family background variables would not be valid IVs. Luckily,
the validity of instruments can be empirically determined (Trostel, Walker
& Woolley 2002), and the set of instruments that we propose has been em-
pirically validated in earlier work (Blackburn & Neumark 1993). In general,
IV-estimates of the returns to an employee's education are higher than esti-
mates obtained by means of OLS (Ashenfelter et al., 1999), no matter what
set of identifying instruments is used.
We wish to identify the causal e®ect of education on incomes for en-
trepreneurs and employees in exactly the same manner. This will allow
us to compare the estimates and biases between the two labor market seg-
ments. From the above mentioned techniques, we use ability proxies and
IV-estimates, where the instrumentation is based on detailed family back-




We estimate the e®ect of education for both entrepreneurs and employees on
a sample drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) in
the US. We replicate several aspects of an earlier study by Blackburn and
Neumark (1993: BN hereafter) that estimated the rate of return to education
for employees based on the same sample. The nationally representative part
of the NLSY consists of 6,111 individuals aged between 14 and 22 years in
1979. They have been interviewed annually up to 1994, and since then on
a bi-annual basis. From these 6,111 persons we extract, per year observed,
the hourly income,1 the number of years of education attained, and a rich
set of personal and family background variables. As a performance measure
we use hourly earnings averaged over a year. We dropped from the sample
all farmers, people working less than 300 hours a year, persons who report
working while still in school, entrepreneurs who were also employed for a
considerable amount of time, and those workers who earned less than one
dollar an hour.2
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables used
in our wage equations based on the representative part of the sample. The
values in Table 1 represent the averages of the speci¯c variable over the pe-
1Created by the NLSY Research Bureau as an average over the past year.
2Farmers are excluded from the sample because their economics are very di®erent from
all other occupations. From 1979 to 2000, we left out 299 farmers. Most studies drop
farmers from their samples or study them separately (cf. VVV). We wanted to make sure
that no hobby entrepreneurs are included in our sample. Therefore, we used the lower
boundary of 300 working hours as an entrepreneur per year and a lower hourly earnings
threshold of one dollar. Including or excluding the lower hourly earnings threshold for
both employees and entrepreneurs did not lead to di®erent results.
12riod 1979-2000. Table A in the Appendix gives an overview of the full names
of the abbreviated variable names. We highlight two variables that are of
main interest. First, we notice that for hourly pay the mean and especially
the standard deviation are higher for entrepreneurs than for employees. This
common observation can be explained by the fact that the incomes of en-
trepreneurs have no ¯xed minimum and do not ¯t into preformed salary
scales. Second, the average level of education that individuals complete in
the US is slightly more than high school, being equal for entrepreneurs and
employees (¼ 13 years).
-Insert Table 1 about here-
3.2 Data suitability
We will now address the suitability of the data to compare the consistent
estimates of the returns to education for entrepreneurs with these of em-
ployees. First, the NLSY contains the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB), which is an IQ-like test score that we can use as a proxy
for ability. ASVAB (administered in 1979-1980)3 includes ten components:
(1) General science, (2) Arithmetic reasoning, (3) Word knowledge, (4) Para-
graph comprehension, (5) Numerical operations, (6) Coding speed, (7) Auto
and shop information, (8) Mathematics knowledge, (9) Mechanical compre-
hension, and (10) Electronic information.4 Following BN, we combine com-
ponent (1) to (4) and (8) into an "academic" test score, and component (6),
3Adminstration of the ASVAB as early as 1979-1980 allows us to treat this variable as
exogenous.
4This decomposition into ten components is suggested by the NLSY Research Bureau.
13(7), (9) and (10) into a "non-academic" one.5 Splitting up the ASVAB into
an academic and a non-academic component gives more insights than using
one combined score, while at the same time it is still possible to make sensible
interpretations. Following BN, we remove the age e®ects from the ASVAB,
as respondents were of di®erent ages when the test was administered, by
regressing each normalized test score on a set of seven age dummies. We
use the individuals' residuals as the new test scores. Including the ASVAB
in the wage equation allows for a comparison between the returns to educa-
tion estimate with and without control for "omitted" ability, as far as this is
proxied correctly by the ASVAB.
A second relevant feature of the NLSY is the presence of detailed family
background variables. These family background characteristics are possibly
good predictors of the educational level of the respondent while otherwise in-
dependent of their future wage. Although administered in 1979-1980, these
variables are most of the time recollections of household characteristics at the
age of 14 (e.g., the presence of a library card in the household). Following
BN, we use those variables as identifying instruments that pass the crite-
ria for quality and validity. The quality criterion comes down to requiring
a su±cient correlation between the set of instruments and the endogenous
regressor, education in this case. Instruments are valid if they a®ect perfor-
mance via the education equation only. A set of instrument therefore passes
the validity test if it is not correlated with the error term in the performance
equation. Variables proposed by BN as components of the set of identifying
instruments were dropped if they turned out invalid. The resulting set of
5Coding speed is not used (see Bishop 1991).
14valid identifying instruments that is of su±cient quality di®ers only slightly
between entrepreneurs and employees; it consists of "A Library Card present
in the household at age 14", "Magazines present in the household at age 14",
"Fathers education", "Mothers education", "A dummy for the presence of a
male in the household", "Number of siblings", "Number of older siblings", "If
there is a foreign language spoken in the household" and, ¯nally, a dummy
measuring "If both parents are present in the household" (see Table A in the
Appendix).
However, critical evaluations of using family background as identifying
instruments for education in an income equation have been expressed by
Card (1999): he doubts the validity of instrument sets consisting of parental
background variables. The idea is that family background variables are very
likely to be correlated with a child's innate ability, and hence a®ect her or
his educational attainment choices, as well as expected returns from school.
Such a set of instruments would therefore not be valid. We acknowledge this
drawback of our choice of instruments. At the same time we try to measure
and minimize its potential negative e®ects by performing Sargan's validity
test and by including indicators for the child's ability into the regression.
Indeed, as we shall see below, the resulting set of identifying instruments for
education, which also includes a measure of parental education, passes the
tests of quality and validity.
A third relevant feature of the sample is that it includes both entrepreneurs
and employees, and records individuals' switches between these states over
time. All entrepreneurship spells, also short ones, are recorded. There-
fore, the subsample of entrepreneurs does not su®er from survival bias, i.e.,
15the returns to education will not pertain to surviving entrepreneurs only.
Moreover, the incomes, education levels and all other relevant variables are
measured in a comparable way for both groups. These features of the data
enable estimating the returns to schooling for employees and entrepreneurs
in a comparable fashion.
A fourth important feature of the NLSY is its panel character. Nineteen
years of information on approximately 6,000 individuals results in a large
number of data-points.6 An advantage of panel data over cross-sectional
ones is the possibility to control for time-varying individual characteristics
and economic °uctuations. To ascertain that the year and age dummies
are not correlated, and therefore not interpretable, we use a decomposition
technique suggested by Deaton (2000). This decomposition ensures that
cohort and time trends are orthogonal to each other. Moreover, panel data
allow the estimation of a ¯xed-e®ects model if there is su±cient variation over
time in the most important variables (education and income, in our case).
This, in turn, would solve the omitted variable bias issue. Since education
does not vary (enough) over time, we apply a random-e®ects model, and thus
control for biases via IV and ability proxies.
4 Estimation results
In this section, we estimate the e®ect of education on income for both en-
trepreneurs and employees. As a benchmark, we start with estimating the
wages of both groups as in Equation (1). Wit represents the log hourly wage,
6In general, this results in more degrees of freedom and less multicolinearity. These
factors together, again, produce improved e±ciency (Hsiao 1986).
16Sit the years of schooling obtained, X0
it a vector containing control variables,
ci an unobserved individual-speci¯c e®ect, and uit a white noise error term.
D0
it represents a vector of dummies controlling for cohort e®ects, age e®ects7
and macroeconomic shocks using a method suggested by Deaton (2000). This
method transforms the year dummies, age dummies and birth year dummies
so that the year e®ects add to zero, and are orthogonal to a time trend.




it + ci + uit (1)
4.1 Returns to education
We report the OLS-estimates resulting from estimating Equation (1) for
both entrepreneurs and employees in Columns (1) and (4) of Table 2, re-
spectively. The results show that without controlling for ability the OLS-
estimated returns to education are .071 for entrepreneurs and .067 for em-
ployees. In accordance with previous studies using US data (Fredland &
Little 1981, Tucker 1985, Tucker 1987, Evans & Leighton 1990, Robinson
& Sexton 1994), the returns are slightly higher for entrepreneurs than for
employees. They are of the same order of magnitude, though.
The ¯rst step in increasing the quality of our estimates is to control for the
bias resulting from omitting ability. We include two compound ability proxies
from the ASVAB test scores in the wage equation - that is, academic and non-
academic ability. We see in Columns (2) and (5) of Table 2 that the estimates
for the return to education drop for both entrepreneurs and employees to .067
and .059, respectively, while all other results stay approximately the same.
7We followed Harmon and Walker (1995) in using age instead of experience in the wage
equation. Experience is a negative function of education, and is therefore endogenous.
17These results are in accordance with the theory that the returns to education
are upward biased when ability is omitted (Griliches 1977). A further e®ect
is that the bias appears to be larger for employees than for entrepreneurs, as
the drop in the schooling estimate is smaller for entrepreneurs. Contrary to
expectations but in accordance with BN, almost none of the ability proxies
is signi¯cant. However, if we use only one compound measure of ability,
its coe±cient is signi¯cantly positive for both entrepreneurs and employees
(see Table B in the Appendix). Nonetheless, this ¯nding indicates that it is
worthwhile to experiment with further decompositions of ability to see which
component explains most of the variance in both equations. Our next step
is to apply IV-estimation.
-Insert Table 2 about here-
For the instrumentation of the possible endogenous education variable
we use the discussed set of family background variables as identifying in-
struments. We check whether the proposed set of instruments is of su±cient
quality, and whether the suggested IVs are valid. To test the ¯rst criterion we
estimate the regression postulated in Equation (2). Schooling is represented
by Sit, and family background variables by F 0
i. X0
it is a vector of controls,







it + ¹i + ²it (2)
The estimation results of Equation (2) presented in Table 3 show that all
family background variables are signi¯cant. About 40% of the variation in
education is explained. A Chi-square test supports the quality of the set of
18identifying instruments.
-Insert Table 3 about here-
To test the second criterion - i.e., instrument validity and over-identi¯cation
- we use the Sargan-test of the validity of instruments.8 For both employees
and entrepreneurs a set of seven identifying instruments results. The Â2
(df6)
test-statistic for entrepreneurs is 4.72 with a p-value of 0.58. This means that
the null hypothesis, assuming exogeneity of the instruments, is not rejected.
The Â2
(df6) test-statistic for employees is 4.24 with a p-value of 0.64. So, also
for employees the instruments for education are exogenous. Hence, the use of
this particular set of family background variables as identifying instruments
is valid.
There remains one important fact that we need to test. Is it justi¯ed
to assume that education is endogenous? If not, implying that education
is exogenous, OLS-estimates would not be biased due to endogeneity. We
performed a Hausman-test to investigate this question. Indeed, we ¯nd that
instrumentation of the education variable is necessary - i.e., education is
endogenous.
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 show the IV-results estimated with 2SLS.
Applying IV results in signi¯cantly higher estimates of the returns to educa-
tion. The returns for employees jump from 6.7% to 10.7%. This is in line with
previous research, using various sets of identifying instruments (Ashenfelter
et al. 1999), and is comparable to the e®ect found by BN. A more revealing
¯nding is the jump in the returns to education for entrepreneurs of 7.1 per-
cent point to 14.2%. This leads to the remarkable result that the returns to
8Following BN, we removed those variables that did not pass this test.
19education for entrepreneurs are 33% higher than the comparable returns for
employees.
However, we have to perform several robustness checks to see whether
the returns to education are really higher for entrepreneurs than for, em-
ployees and to be able to interpret the result appropriately. In what follows
we address and test several explanations that would lead to very di®erent
interpretations.
4.2 Robustness checks
So far, we have implicitly assumed that individuals' choices for education
do not a®ect their choice of employment status, i.e., for entrepreneur or for
employee. However, every time a speci¯c sample is selected from a larger pop-
ulation, there is the possibility of sample-selection bias (Wooldridge 2002).
It may, for instance, be the case that individuals with high (or low) edu-
cation are selecting into (or away from) self-employment. More speci¯cally,
there could be two alternative, but spurious causes for the ¯nding that en-
trepreneurs have a higher return to education than employees. First, returns
to education for entrepreneurs would be higher if, on average, entrepreneurs
are lower educated and the returns to schooling feature decreasing returns.
Second, if entrepreneurs are higher educated, on average, and the returns to
education are increasing, then entrepreneurs would also get a higher return to
their education than would employees. Such combination of ¯ndings would
lead to the (misleading) observation that employees experience higher returns
to education than do entrepreneurs. This example illustrates the importance
20of dealing with such issues of selectivity.9 Few previous studies have done this
in satisfactory manners (Rees & Shah 1986, Gill 1988, MacPherson 1988, De
Wit & Van Winden 1989, Dolton & Makepeace 1990, Taylor 1996, Clark,
Drinkwater & Leslie 1998).
Hence, to investigate whether one of these alternative selectivity-related
explanations is valid, we have to analyze: (1) whether the returns to educa-
tion are increasing, decreasing or constant as a function of years of education;
and (2) whether entrepreneurs have higher or lower education levels than
their employed counterparts. We pursue two routes to assess the functional
form of returns to education, where we distinguish between entrepreneurs
and employees. First, we split both the sample of entrepreneurs and the one
of employees into two equal parts: one with higher than median education
levels, the other with below-median education levels. A comparison of the
resulting (four) IV-estimates of the return to education shows that, if any-
thing, the returns to education are increasing: they are higher for the better
educated halves of both samples.
As to the second route, we re-estimated our wage equations while in-
cluding the education squared as an additional regressor.10 For both en-
trepreneurs and employees the returns to education follow a U-shaped dis-
tribution, with its minimum at 8.2 and 4.7 years of education completed
for entrepreneurs and employees, respectively. By far the majority of en-
9Throughout, we assume that individuals decide upon their educational investments
and then choose to become employees or entrepreneurs. In reality, these decisions might
be made simultaneously or individuals might choose their employment status and then
the most compatible educational stream.
10We account for the potential endogenous character of education squared by including
the residuals of the ¯rst-stage education equation and the ¯rst-stage squared education
equation.
21trepreneurs - i.e., 98.5% - has completed more than 8.2 years of education,
whereas even more than 99.9% of the employees have completed more than
4.7 years of schooling. Hence, for 99.8% of the total sample returns to edu-
cation are increasing. We conclude that both routes lead to the same conclu-
sion: if anything, returns to education are increasing, both for entrepreneurs
and for employees. Selectivity would therefore only be a possible spurious
explanation for the higher returns for entrepreneurs in case higher educated
individuals are selected into entrepreneurship.
We use several methods to investigate the possibility that education de-
termines the selection into self-employment positively. A ¯rst indication can
be found in Table 1: the mean education levels for entrepreneurs and em-
ployees are almost equal. To check whether the education level has indeed
no in°uence on the employment status, as the similar mean levels of edu-
cation suggest, we estimate a random-e®ects probit. The results in Table
4 reveal that the e®ect of education on the time-varying employment sta-
tus is insigni¯cant. This result is consistent with previous research into the
relationship between years of education and entrepreneurship selection.11
-Insert Table 4 about here-
An alternative method to test for sample-selection bias is based on work
by Nijman and Verbeek (1992). They suggest to include a lag of the em-
ployment status in the wage regression. The underlying assumption to this
approach is that sample selection is related to the idiosyncratic errors ¹it
only. Under the null hypothesis, ¹it should not be correlated to any other
11The meta-analysis by VVV demonstrated that 75% of all such studies ¯nd an insignif-
icant e®ect.
22period than the current period. When performing this test, our results in-
dicate that the lagged employment status variable is insigni¯cant in both
the income equation of entrepreneurs and employees. So, again, the sample-
selection hypothesis is rejected.
Another, quite similar test is to include in the wage equation the frac-
tion of total past labor market experience that the respondent has been an
entrepreneur. In this way, we measure more precisely in what way state de-
pendence in°uences our results. Performing this test reveals that the e®ect
is insigni¯cant for entrepreneurs and signi¯cant for wage workers. A problem
attached to introducing a lag or the 'entrepreneurial experience fraction' into
the wage regression is that it includes the human capital e®ect on income
of previous entrepreneurship experience. This could obscure our selection
test. A solution to this problem is to include a lead instead of a lag of em-
ployment status into the wage equation: current wages are unlikely to be
a®ected by the future decision to be an entrepreneur. Incorporating a lead
in the wage equation results in the rejection of the presence of selection for
both entrepreneurs and employees.
All in all, the results lead to the conclusion that our estimates of the
returns to education for entrepreneurs and employees are not biased by se-
lectivity. Therefore, a correction is not required.
The second robustness check relates to the unit of measurement of the
returns to education. Our estimations suggest that the percentage gain in
terms of income of a marginal year of education for entrepreneurs is higher
than for employees. The question is whether the returns to education are
also higher for entrepreneurs in absolute terms: does a year of education
23generate more dollars per hour for an entrepreneur than for an employee?
For instance, if entrepreneurs earned much less per hour, on average, than
employees, then the higher percentage gain could correspond with a lower
dollar gain. To answer this question, we estimate the returns to education
for entrepreneurs and employees using hourly pay as the dependent variable
instead of log hourly pay, keeping all else equal. We present the results in
Table C in the Appendix. The results still provide support for the ¯nding
in terms of percentages: the returns to education in dollars are higher for
entrepreneurs than for employees.
A third robustness check concerns the assumed log-normality of the dis-
tribution of hourly pay. The estimates in Table 2 have been obtained un-
der this assumption, both for entrepreneurs and for employees. Especially
for entrepreneurs, this assumption might be questionable (Blanch°ower &
Meyer 1994) To this end, we re-calculated the percentage returns to educa-
tion for both groups using the results from Table C in the Appendix. In
this way, we circumvent using the results obtained under the assumption
of log-normality of the hourly earnings distribution.12 The outcome, again,
supports our claim that the returns are higher for entrepreneurs than for
employees (with returns to education of 0.141 and 0.127, respectively). This
outcome is apparently invariant to the assumed log-normality of the hourly
earnings distribution.
Our fourth check relates to the question as to whether the di®erence in
returns to education between entrepreneurs and employees can be attributed
to a risk premium obtained by higher educated entrepreneurs. It could be
12We divide the IV-estimate of the education coe±cient in table C by the average wage
(for entrepreneurs and employees separately).
24the case that more highly educated individuals require higher risk premia for
being an entrepreneur: higher educated individuals might experience more
additional income risk as an entrepreneur compared to an employee vis-µ a-vis
lower educated individuals. We base this robustness check on three obser-
vations derived from our data. First, regressing the (time) variance of the
incomes13 of individual entrepreneurs on their education levels and some con-
trol variables renders no signi¯cant education e®ect. Hence, the variance of
the entrepreneurial income is not higher for more highly educated individuals,
all else equal. Second, estimating the same equation for employees reveals a
signi¯cant positive coe±cient for education. Third, the variance in earnings
is lower for employees than for entrepreneurs, at all possible education levels.
These three observations together imply that entrepreneurs are exposed to
more income risk than employees are, but that the di®erence is a decreasing
rather than an increasing function of education. Based on this, we can safely
assume that the higher returns to education for entrepreneurs are not a kind
of risk premium.
Hence, our ¯nding that the returns to education are higher for entrepreneurs
than for employees is not due to selectivity. It is neither due to wrong as-
sumptions with regard to the functional form of the income distribution of
entrepreneurs, nor to percentage gains that would not translate into absolute
gains. Moreover, the higher returns to education for entrepreneurs cannot
be explained in terms of higher required risk premia for higher educated
entrepreneurs.
So why is education more valuable for entrepreneurs? We propose a
13To be more precise, the variance of the residuals of the income equations as presented
above is the dependent variable in this case.
25simple explanation: entrepreneurs have more freedom to optimize their em-
ployment of education. Entrepreneurs are not constrained by rules from
superiors and can decide on how to implement their education in such a way
that its productive e®ect is the highest. In contrast to the entrepreneur, the
organizational structure surrounding an employee makes it di±cult for the
employee to optimize the productive e®ect of education. Besides, the orga-
nization cannot adapt its structure to every individual due to organizational
inertia and individual incompatibilities. This di®erence in ability to optimize
the productivity of education for entrepreneurs and employees might there-
fore be an explanation for the higher returns to education for entrepreneurs
vis-µ a-vis employees.
4.3 Remaining e®ects
Some of the e®ects of the control variables presented in Table 1 are notable.
Males earn statistically and economically signi¯cantly higher incomes than fe-
males. This con¯rms previous ¯ndings for both segments of the labor market.
Moreover, the extent of the gender e®ect di®ers largely across labor market
segments. Male wage employees earn 24% more than female wage employees.
The comparable di®erence between male and female entrepreneurs is 67%.
This large di®erence of the gender e®ect of entrepreneurs vis-µ a-vis employ-
ees is consistent with previous studies (Moore 1982, Tucker 1987, De Wit
& Van Winden 1989, Dolton & Makepeace 1990, Robinson & Sexton 1994).
Interestingly, the correlation between being married and income is higher for
employees than for entrepreneurs: it is more than twice as large for employ-
ees, and insigni¯cant for entrepreneurs. The income of married employees
26is 6% higher than the income of single employees, whereas this di®erence is
an insigni¯cant 2.5% for entrepreneurs. Previous ¯ndings support this result
(Moore 1982, Tucker 1987, Gill 1988, Dolton & Makepeace 1990, Evans &
Leighton 1990). A striking result is that the e®ect of race (i.e., being black)
is much larger for entrepreneurs (Blanch°ower & Meyer 1994) than for em-
ployees: 24 versus 10%. The support for this di®erence in previous literature
is less clear. Fairly and Meyer (1996) and Moore (1982) support this ¯nding,
while Fredland and Little (1981) and Rees and Shah (1986) report that the
e®ect of race is smaller for entrepreneurs than for employees. Evans and
Leighton (1990) and Dolton and Makepeace (1990) even ¯nd that ethnicity
is positively related to the incomes of entrepreneurs. A side remark should
be made about these other studies. We explicitly distinguish "blacks" as an
ethnic group. Doing this ensures that the often very mixed e®ect of other
ethnicities is taken out. Other studies reporting race e®ects have neglected
this di®erentiation, and are therefore less clearly interpretable.
Comparing the explanatory power of both equations leads to the ob-
servation that a much larger proportion of the variance in earnings can be
explained by the observed factors for the group of employees than for en-
trepreneurs. This result is not uncommon (Poutvaara & Tuomala 2003).
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to estimate the e®ect of education on the perfor-
mance of entrepreneurs. The performance measure we used was earnings per
hour (averaged over a year) such that the entrepreneurial returns to education
27can be estimated and compared to those of employees. The methodological
rigor applied in studies of the returns to education for employees has been
our benchmark, since this rigor is lacking in the comparable entrepreneur-
ship literature. Previous studies have measured the returns to education for
entrepreneurs by means of (conditional) correlations. The following observa-
tions had emerged from a meta-analysis based on that literature: The returns
to education for entrepreneurs are positive and their order of magnitude is
comparable to the returns to education for entrepreneurs. However, these
estimates might be biased if problems relating to unobserved heterogeneity,
endogeneity and selectivity are present. We address and, if required, solve
these problems when estimating the returns to education for entrepreneurs
and for employees in a comparable way. Via the usage of ability proxies we
o®er evidence for the fact that omission of ability results in an upward bias
of the education coe±cient in an OLS-equation. This bias turned out to
be more pronounced for employees than for entrepreneurs. Consistent with
the literature, our OLS-estimates also indicate that the return to education
is slightly higher for entrepreneurs than for employees. However, when we
apply IV to solve the endogenous schooling problem, the returns to educa-
tion jump from 5.9% to 10.7% for employees and from 6.7% to 14.2% for
entrepreneurs, where the ¯rst jump is comparable to previous ¯ndings in la-
bor economics. Surprisingly, this indicates that the returns to education for
entrepreneurs are not slightly higher, but an impressive 33% higher than the
returns to education for employees. The absence of sample selection bias and
the further robustness of this result adds to the credibility of this ¯nding.
All together, we think that our ¯ndings bear implications for researchers and
28policy makers.
The observation that OLS-estimates are biased and that the extent of
this bias di®ers per labor market group should be the starting point for
researchers investigating returns to education for entrepreneurs. Studies on
screening implicitly assume that the bias resulting from omitting ability and
not treating schooling as an endogenous variable is similar for entrepreneurs
and employees. Our results do not support this assumption, and show that
this bias di®ers per population studied. We suggest that further research
should aim at understanding the size of this bias.
Furthermore, replicating our study with di®erent data, also for various
countries and possibly with di®erent sets of instruments, would be useful to
con¯rm the ¯ndings that are now based on one study only. Alternatively,
our ¯ndings could be validated (or not) by means of twins research. In any
case, more insight into the causal relationship between education and the
performance of entrepreneurs is required. Moreover, research that di®eren-
tiates educational types would be insightful, such that we can compare the
returns to, for instance, vocational education for entrepreneurs and employ-
ees. As we shall see below, such research forms the basis for several policy
implications.
Before we discuss policy implications, it is important to elaborate on the
remaining untested assumptions made in this context. First, we assume that
the social return of entrepreneurial activity is larger than the private return
that accrues to the entrepreneur her or himself. Second, we assume that the
di®erence between the social and private bene¯ts of entrepreneurial activity
is larger than this di®erence is for employees. A successful entrepreneur is, for
29example, more likely to in°uence competition in a market positively than is
an employee. Also, new and innovative ideas can be brought into the market
more easily by entrepreneurs than by employees.14 Third, we assume that
individuals invest in schooling at a stage in their lives at which they do not yet
know, in general, whether they will become entrepreneurs or employees, or a
(sequential) combination of both. As a consequence, investment in schooling
is not motivated by the speci¯c expected return when belonging to the group
of entrepreneurs, but by some (weighted) average expected return of both
employment modes. Our fourth assumption is that individuals, as well as
policy makers, bankers and other parties involved, do have no more insight
in the returns to education than we as researchers have. This implies that
individuals and policy makers share the common opinion that the returns to
education are similar for entrepreneurs and for employees.
Clearly, our ¯nding that the entrepreneurial returns to education are high,
and that education is therefore a key success factor for a starting enterprise,
is informative for the development of educational policies, as well as for
bankers' and capital suppliers' strategies with respect to (selecting) starters.
Moreover, the adequate design of subsidy and tax measures that target both
entrepreneurs (and starters) and their capital suppliers, often by the national
Ministry of Economic A®airs, or similar authorities, might bene¯t from this
key insight.
Policy makers should be aware of our result that the returns to education
for entrepreneurs are substantially higher than those for employees. In this
14In addition to these positive external e®ects of entrepreneurial activity, entrepreneurs
are often credited for their impact on labor demand. However, this is a short-term rather
than a long-term e®ect: in the absence of new ¯rms, their demand for labor would be
e®ectuated by growing incumbent ¯rms.
30respect, policy-making authorities could launch two policies. First, they can
invest in higher education for (prospective) entrepreneurs. Second, they can
invest in stimulating higher educated individuals to opt for an entrepreneurial
career. The ¯rst policy will increase the likelihood that entrepreneurs will
perform better, and that they will generate more bene¯ts that will not only
accrue to the entrepreneurs themselves but also to society as a whole. In so
doing, the social costs of bankruptcies will decrease accordingly. The sec-
ond strategy appeals to the fact that, at least in Europe, entrepreneurship
seems not to be the favored option, or even to be part of the choice set,
amongst young people with higher education degrees. They usually prefer
working in large multinational enterprises, rather than to even think about
self-employment alternatives. We strongly believe in the bene¯ts of govern-
mental programs to stimulate the awareness among college and university
students of the high potential of the entrepreneurship route. For sure, future
research into the entrepreneurial returns of speci¯c types of education may
further increase the e®ectiveness of such policies.
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34Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Employees Entrepreneurs
n¤ Mean SD n¤ Mean SD
Academic 62073 0.06 0.84 4005 0.07 0.89
Age 62073 28.17 5.66 4005 30.28 5.31
Being Religious 61902 0.18 0.38 3999 0.15 0.36
Being Shy 60349 0.61 0.49 3873 0.55 0.50
Birth Year 62073 1960 2.18 4005 1960 2.19
Black 62073 0.11 0.31 4005 0.05 0.21
Education 61912 12.89 2.39 4001 12.97 2.45
Fathers Education 56469 11.74 3.47 3695 12.17 3.44
Foreign Language 62054 0.14 0.35 4002 0.14 0.35
Gender 62073 0.52 0.50 4005 0.64 0.48
Hispanic 62073 0.06 0.24 4005 0.05 0.22
Library Card 61823 0.74 0.44 3991 0.77 0.42
Live Outside City 59589 0.22 0.42 3792 0.21 0.41
Live in South 59062 0.33 0.47 3807 0.26 0.44
Locus of Control 61667 49.94 28.56 3952 54.01 27.80
Log Hourly Wage 62073 10.32 15.85 4005 14.38 26.72
Magazines 61701 0.66 0.47 3990 0.74 0.44
Married 62072 0.50 0.50 4004 0.63 0.48
Mothers Education 58917 11.52 2.66 3829 12.04 2.45
No Male in Home 62073 0.11 0.31 4005 0.09 0.29
Not Academic 62073 0.08 0.80 4005 0.15 0.87
Not Healthy 61468 0.02 0.15 3955 0.04 0.19
Older Siblings # 57815 1.97 1.89 3724 1.87 1.88
Parents Present 62073 0.76 0.43 4005 0.77 0.42
Siblings # 62021 3.29 2.20 4000 3.17 2.08
¤Note. Observation number displayed is the aggregate observation num-
ber from 1979 till 2002.
35Table 2: OLS and IV wage equation estimation results
Employees Entrepreneurs
(1. OLS) (2. OLS) (3. IV) (4. OLS) (5. OLS) (6. IV)
Education .067¤¤¤ .059¤¤¤ .107¤¤¤ .071¤¤¤ .067¤¤¤ .142¤¤¤
.002 .002 .007 .009 .010 .026
Academic .015 -.093¤¤¤ .026 -.142
.013 .021 .065 .088
Not Academic .064¤¤¤ .113¤¤¤ -.002 .075
.013 .017 .064 .074
Gender .242¤¤¤ .229¤¤¤ .240¤¤¤ .668¤¤¤ .668¤¤¤ .648¤¤¤
.009 .009 .010 .044 .045 .050
Marital Status .058¤¤¤ .058¤¤¤ .058¤¤¤ .025 .025 .026
.004 .004 .004 .032 .032 .036
Not Healthy -.048¤¤¤ -.047¤¤¤ -.050¤¤¤ -.076 -.076 -.061
.010 .010 .011 .070 .070 .079
Live Outside City -.071¤¤¤ -.071¤¤¤ -.064¤¤¤ -.126¤¤¤ -.127¤¤¤ -.150¤¤¤
.006 .006 .006 .041 .041 .045
Live in South -.077¤¤¤ -.068¤¤¤ -.063¤¤¤ .034 .034 .044
.010 .010 .012 .048 .048 .054
Locus of Control .001¤¤¤ .001¤¤¤ .001¤¤¤ .003¤¤¤ .003¤¤¤ .002¤¤
.000 .000 .000 .001 .001 .001
Hispanic -.005 .014 .018 -.123 -.113 -.094
.022 .022 .025 .117 .118 .133
Black -.136¤¤¤ -.090¤¤¤ -.103¤¤¤ -.244¤¤¤ -.231¤¤ -.235¤¤¤
.014 .015 .018 .088 .090 .114
Constant .048 .145 -.499¤¤¤ -.962 -.926 -1.590¤
.092 .092 .133 .848 .850 .876
R2 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.28 0.28 0.27
N 55769 55769 47152 3519 3519 2951
Note. Standard errors in italics. Each estimation controls for year e®ects, age e®ects and
macroeconomic shocks (Deaton 2000). ¤p-value · .10, ¤¤p-value · .05 and ¤¤¤p-value · .01.











No Male in Home .484¤¤¤
.117
Siblings # -.141¤¤¤ -.128¤¤¤
.019 .046
Older Siblings # .086¤¤¤ .097¤¤¤
.021 .049
Foreign Language .198¤¤ .405¤
.100 .212






Note. Standard errors in italics. Each estimation con-
trols for year e®ects, age e®ects and macroeconomic
shocks (Deaton 2000). ¤p-value · .10, ¤¤p-value ·
.05 and ¤¤¤p-value · .01.
37Table 4: Random-E®ects Probit


























Note. Standard errors in italics. Each esti-
mation controls for year e®ects, age e®ects
and macroeconomic shocks (Deaton 2000).






Age Squared Age squared in years
Academic An ASVAB test score indicating academic intelligence
Being Religious A dummy that indicates 1 if the person is adhering to a strict religion
Being Shy A dummy that indicates 1 if the person was shy as a child
Black A dummy that indicates 1 if the person is black
Education Total education completed (in years)
Entrepreneur A dummy that indicates 1 if the person is an entrepreneur
Gender A dummy that indicates 1 if the person is male
Hispanic A dummy that indicates 1 if the person is Hispanic
Live in South A dummy that indicates 1 if the person lives in the south of the US
Live Outside City A dummy that indicates 1 if the person lives outside a city
Locus of Control Locus of control, with a high value indicates high internal locus of control
Log Hourly Wage Log income per hour (in dollars)
Marital Status A dummy that indicates 1 if the person is married
Not Healthy A dummy that indicates 1 if the person feels not healthy
Not Academic An ASVAB test score indicating non academic intelligence
White A dummy that indicates 1 if the person is white
Instruments
Fathers Education Education of the father (in years)
Foreign Language A dummy that indicates 1 if foreign language spoken in household
Library Card A dummy that indicates 1 if there was a library card in household at age 14
Magazines A dummy that indicates 1 if there were magazines in household at age 14
Mothers Education Education of the mother (in years)
No Male in Home A dummy that indicates 1 if there was no man in the household at age 14
Older Siblings # Number of older siblings
Parents Present A dummy that indicates 1 if Father and mother in household at age 14
Siblings # Number of siblings










Marital Status .058¤¤¤ .025
.004 .032
Not Healthy -.047¤¤¤ -.076
.010 .070
Live Outside City -.071¤¤¤ -.127¤¤¤
.006 .041
Live in South -.069¤¤¤ .034
.010 .048










Note. Standard errors in italics. Each estimation con-
trols for year e®ects, age e®ects and macroeconomic
shocks (Deaton 2000). ¤p-value · .10, ¤¤p-value ·
.05 and ¤¤¤p-value · .01.
40Table C: OLS and IV wage equation where the dependent variable is hourly
income (instead of log hourly income)
Employees Entrepreneurs
(1. OLS) (2. OLS) (3. IV) (4. OLS) (5. OLS) (6. IV)
Education .949¤¤¤ .839¤¤¤ 1.328¤¤¤ .984¤¤¤ .799¤¤¤ 2.068¤¤¤
.039 .044 .142 .203 .225 .634
Academic .397 -.816¤¤ 1.558 -1.214
.270 .427 1.435 2.123
Not Academic .434¤¤¤ 1.090¤¤¤ -.407 1.078
.270 .341 1.423 1.782
Gender 2.642¤¤¤ 2.545¤¤¤ 2.616¤¤¤ 6.417¤¤¤ 6.487¤¤¤ 6.623¤¤¤
.182 .186 .217 1.000 1.040 1.213
Marital Status 1.051¤¤¤ 1.031¤¤¤ 1.080¤¤¤ .122 .158 .003
.146 .146 .166 1.029 1.030 1.215
Not Healthy -.654 -.613 -.612 -3.662 -3.700 -3.383
.400 .400 .455 2.500 2.500 2.932
Live Outside City -.991¤¤¤ -.990¤¤¤ -.936¤¤¤ -2.493¤¤ -2.521¤¤ -3.172¤¤
.189 .189 .216 1.150 1.150 1.349
Live in South -.907¤¤¤ -.816¤¤¤ -.781¤¤¤ 1.400 1.374 2.357
.202 .202 .240 1.076 1.077 1.283
Locus of Control .013¤¤¤ .011¤¤¤ .006 .049¤¤ .045¤¤ .032
.003 .003 .004 .017 .018 .021
Hispanic .487 .676 .890 3.247 3.712 4.414
.441 .441 .526 2.757 2.767 3.268
Black -1.169¤¤¤ -.684¤¤¤ -.738¤ -4.437¤¤ -3.830¤ -5.344¤
.296 .305 .387 2.245 2.284 3.173
Constant -11.251¤¤¤ -9.869¤¤¤ -17.545¤¤¤ -26.568 -24.958 -39.750
3.581 3.589 4.573 27.907 27.914 30.295
R2 .100 .101 .09 .072 .073 .072
N 55769 55769 47152 3519 3519 2952
Note. Standard errors in italics. Each estimation controls for year e®ects, age e®ects and
macroeconomic shocks (Deaton 2000). ¤p-value · .10, ¤¤p-value · .05 and ¤¤¤p-value · .01.
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